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We envision a world where the developer would receive each morning in her GitHub dashboard a list of potential
patches that fix certain production failures. For this, we propose a novel program repair scheme, with the unique
feature of being applicable to production directly. We present the design and implementation of a prototype
system for Java, called Itzal, that performs patch generation for uncaught exceptions in production. We have
performed two empirical experiments to validate our system: the first one on 34 failures from 14 different
software applications, the second one on 16 seeded failures in 3 real open-source e-commerce applications for
which we have set up a realistic user traffic. This validates the novel and disruptive idea of using program repair
directly in production.
1 INTRODUCTION
In modern distributed systems running on the cloud, software failures happen constantly [Oppen-
heimer et al. 2003]. The leading company in the business of production failure monitoring, called
OverOps, has reported that a popular Java web application suffers from 9.2 million exceptions per
month on average, due to an average of 53 unique root causes [Burton 2016].
What about automatically generating source-code patches that would prevent production failures
from happening again? We dream of a world where the developer would receive each morning in her
GitHub dashboard a list of potential patches that fix certain production failures. This is the blue-sky
vision we elaborate in this paper.
This is fundamentally different from traditional program repair (e.g. [Le Goues et al. 2012; Nguyen
et al. 2013a]). Indeed, traditional program repair is built on premises that are not adequate to fix
production failures. First, most repair systems require one or several failing test cases to guide the
repair process. But it has been shown that it is extremely difficult to reproduce production failures
and translate them into failing test cases [Bell et al. 2013; Bettenburg et al. 2008; Jin and Orso 2012].
Second, traditional program repair uses a regression test suite to verify that the generated patch has
not introduced regressions, with no guarantee whatsoever that the regression test suite covers all the
behaviors used in production, resulting in incorrect patches [Martinez et al. 2016; Qi et al. 2015;
Smith et al. 2015].
There is a fundamental gap between the vision of automatically generating patches for production
failures and the state-of-the-art of program repair. This is what we address here – we bring program
repair to production failures. In this paper, we specify a novel scheme for program repair in production,
and we present the design and implementation of a prototype system for Java, called Itzal.
Itzal works as follows. First, it uses production oracles (such as uncaught exceptions) to detect
failures and trigger patch search. Second, right after the failure is detected in production, a patch
is searched in a parallel environment that mimics the production one. This search is asynchronous
so that patch synthesis has a negligible overhead on the production system. Third, the synthesized
patches are validated based on traffic that is an exact copy of the production user traffic – we call it
shadow traffic. Patches that fix a production failure and do not introduce regressions that are visible
on the end-to-end user traffic are proposed to the developer.
To show that the Itzal vision is feasible, we have implemented it for Java. To demonstrate that it is
generic, we have considered two different patch models: one for null pointer exceptions (#1 exception
in production [Burton 2016]), and one for arbitrary uncaught runtime exceptions. We have performed
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two large scale experiments: the first one on 34 failures from 14 different software applications used
in production, the second one on 16 seeded failures in 3 real open-source e-commerce applications
for which we have set up a realistic user traffic. Those experiments validate our novel concept of
patch synthesis in production.
In summary, our contributions are:
• A novel scheme for program repair in production, it performs patch synthesis and regression
testing live based on user traffic. This is a fundamental breakthrough with traditional program
repair based on tests or static analysis that may open a new research avenue.
• The design and implementation of a prototype in Java, called Itzal. It is made open-source for
fostering follow-up research in that new area.
• The evaluation over 34 production failures from 14 different large scale software applications.
It is the first proof-of-concept that our vision of program repair in production is feasible.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the current challenges
of patch generation. Section 3 presents Itzal. Section 4 presents the evaluation of Itzal. Section 5
presents the related works and Section 6 concludes.
2 CHALLENGES OF AUTOMATIC SOFTWARE REPAIR
Automatic software repair is the process of fixing software bugs automatically. However, this broad
definition covers techniques that are fundamentally different. First, “repair” means patching the
program code, and the literature [Monperrus 2015] mainly refers to this as “program repair”, “patch
generation” or colloquially “automatic bug fixing”. An archetypal program repair system is GenProg
[Le Goues et al. 2012]. Second, repair also means changing the program state in response to
field failures at runtime. The literature uses “runtime repair”, “self-healing” and “failure-oblivious
computing” to refer to this idea. An archetypal self-healing system is ClearView [Perkins et al. 2009].
Note that there is a key difference here: runtime repair does not mean generating source code
patch as done in patch generation. Runtime repair in production means modifying the execution. For
example, ClearView does not generate source code patches, it restores CPU register invariants at
runtime. Reversely, GenProg cannot be used in production, since it takes as input test cases.
2.1 Challenges of Patch Generation
In production, end-users trigger bugs by exercising the system with inputs and sequences of interac-
tions that were unforeseen by the development team. When this happens, they may report the bug
to the development team through a support channel or a bug tracking system. The problem is that
there is a huge gap between an issue reported by an end-user and a failing test case that is usable by a
test-suite based repair system. The main problem is that the issue is reported in natural language by
end users, and often the description is incomplete. The extreme difficulty of reproducing production
bugs has been confirmed by numerous studies (e.g., [Bell et al. 2013; Bettenburg et al. 2008; Jin
and Orso 2012]) and little support is available today for this task. Thus, current patch generation
systems are inapplicable for production failures, because much manual work is needed to translate
an end-user problem into a valid failing test case. Similarly, it is also difficult to convert production
traffic into regression tests.
In this paper, we recast patch generation in a unique and novel way: we bring patch generation to
production.
2.2 Challenge of Self-Healing Systems
Self-healing software systems have completely different challenges. The core idea of self-healing
software is to modify the execution in response to a runtime failure. The first and foremost challenge
Fig. 1. The blueprint of Itzal. The key idea is to duplicate user traffic via a “shadower”, the duplicated traffic
is used to search for patches and to validate candidate patches.
of self-healing systems is to assess whether the state after healing is viable. Since self-healing
software replaces a crashing failure into a continued execution, this execution is speculative in
essence and no programmer has designed it upfront. There is very little work on assessing the
viability of program states after self-healing [Locasto et al. 2008]. The second challenge is to
transform those runtime modifications into valuable knowledge for developers. One solution is to log
every execution modification, but this may represent an enormous volume of logs for any production
system with large traffic, and this volume would be of little use for developers.
In this paper, the novelty we propose is that developers receive source code patches directly
synthesized from production executions.
3 PROGRAM REPAIR ON PRODUCTION FAILURES
We now present Itzal, a novel program repair technique for generating patches directly in the
production environment.
Intuition: The intuition behind Itzal is twofold. First, one can use production runtime contracts
to drive the generation of source code patches. This includes classical pre- and post-conditions as
well as implicit contracts such as that an accessed variable must not be null. The latter is important
because the violations of those implicit contracts come for free in any modern runtime, usually in the
form of runtime exceptions. The second intuition is that one can use the diversity of the production
inputs to perform in-the-field regression testing on the synthesized patches.
Applicability: The requirement to deploy Itzal is that the application has a message-driven
architecture [Boner et al. 2014], i.e., must use requests. The type of requests may vary between
applications, it can be for example: 1) a request sent by a user’s browser to a webserver, 2) a REST
message for a micro-service application, 3) for a mobile application, a touch event triggered when
a user touches a mobile device’s screen. An extreme case of message-driven software is serverless
computing, also known as Function-as-a-Service [Adzic and Chatley 2017], such as Amazon Lambda,
where there is no state between requests. One may consider that Function-as-a-Service is a killer
application domain of Itzal.
Algorithm 1 The main Itzal algorithm
Input: A: the Unmodified Application
Input: G: the Patch Generation Service
Input: V: the Regression Assessment Service
1: while new request r from Client do
2: out put ← A(r)
3: send out put to Client
4: if r produces a failure then
5: patches← G(r)
6: f ailureCountr ++
7: push patches to V
8: else
9: send (r,out put) to V for regression analysis
10: end if
11: if ∃ not “regressive patches” ∈V then
12: report patches to developers
13: end if
14: end while
3.1 Blueprint Architecture
The Itzal architecture is composed of three main components that are set up around an existing
unmodified production application, as shown in Figure 1.
(1) The Shadower (see Section 3.1.3) is used to duplicate the requests of the Unmodified Applica-
tion. The duplicated requests are then sent in parallel to the Patch Generation Service and the
Regression Assessment Service.
(2) The Patch Generation Service (see Section 3.1.1) is the service that searches for patches that fix
a given failure. It uses a failure detection mechanism called “Request-oracle” in this paper to
determine whether the application has successfully handled a request.
(3) The Regression Assessment Service (see Section 3.1.2) performs regression testing on the patches
based on user traffic. It applies the generated patches on a copy of the application – the shadow
application – and Shadower duplicates the user traffic to the shadow application in order to
observe the behavior of the patched application and potentially detect regressions.
Eventually, the patches generated by Itzal are communicated to the developers, for instance using
automated pull requests on GitHub. The developers can directly merge them or further improve them.
Algorithm: Algorithm 1 shows the workflow of Itzal. Shadower receives the request from the
client (line 1). Then it redirects the request to the Unmodified Application (line 2). Once the request
has been handled by the Unmodified Application, the response is sent back to the client (line 3). If
the Request-oracle has determined that there is a failure, the request is sent to the Patch Generation
Service (arrow a in Figure 1 and line 5). The patches generated by Patch Generation Service that
pass the Request-oracle (i.e., that fix the failure at hand) are sent to Regression Assessment Service
(line 7). If the request has succeeded (i.e., no failure on the original application), the request is also
sent to the Regression Assessment Service (line 9) where all the previously generated patches are
being regressed on-the-fly against the new requests. When the Regression Assessment Service has
identified patches with no regressions, it sends them to the developers.
3.1.1 Patch Generation Service. For every request, Itzal verifies whether the application has
succeeded to answer the request using a Request-oracle. For instance, in a webserver, one can check
the return code of HTTP request (“assert response_code != 5XX (internal server error)”) or check
the presence or not of an exception. Itzal works with generic oracles such as checking the absence
of exceptions (e.g., in a web request container or in a thread monitor), and it can also work with
domain-specific oracles written by software engineers on top of domain concepts and data (e.g., the
returned XML must comply with a specific schema).
For each failing request, a Patch Generation Service searches for patches that prevent the failure or
any other ones from happening according to a patch model. On this, Itzal piggy-backs on existing
research [Durieux et al. 2017a; Rinard et al. 2004]. Itzal is agnostic to the patch service, it supports
several patch models: we have implemented two of them, both used in our evaluation.
Definition: a “patch model” enables one to enumerate all patches according to a specification of
the search space.
For each explored candidate patch, the Patch Generation Service calls Request-oracle to verify
that the request has been correctly handled by the patch under consideration, i.e., the failure has been
fixed. As the Patch Generation Service generates the patches based on only one request (the failing
one), the patches may break the behavior of the application for other requests, i.e., they may introduce
regressions. Thus, if the patch is successful on the failing request, it is transferred to the Regression
Assessment Service (arrow b in Figure 1) which will further regress it on incoming requests.
The execution of candidate patches can change the state of the application in runtime. To nullify
the potential side effects of the request or the new behavior introduced in synthesized patches, each
execution is done in a completely sandboxed environment. In other words, the side-effects of the
execution of the patch candidate never propagate to the production application by construction.
Beyond null dereferences, Itzal can work with any patch model, whether domain-specific (e.g., for
out-of-bounds exception [Sidiroglou-Douskos et al. 2015]) or generic (e.g., Genprog [Le Goues et al.
2012]). Note if the patch model generates too many patches (i.e., the search space is too large), it can
possibly be a problem as it can incur a huge computation overhead on the Patch Generation Service
and much more importantly on the Regression Assessment Service.
3.1.2 Regression Assessment Service. The patches generated by the Patch Generation Service can
introduce regressions as their generation involves only the failing request. The Regression Assessment
Service has the responsibility to check the behaviors of the application when the generated patches
are injected on other requests.
The Regression Assessment Service uses an “execution comparison oracle” to compare the output
of the Unmodified Application with that of a patched version for the same request. If the outputs are
different, the Regression Assessment Service discards the patch and marks it as a “regressive patch”.
For example, an execution comparison oracle for a web server can compare the HTML texts of both
versions.
Definition: an “execution comparison oracle” is a mechanism to detect changed behaviors in
production.
The comparison is not necessarily a byte-to-byte one, it can include heuristics to discard transient
information such as time, cookie identifiers, etc. To increase the accuracy of the regression evaluation,
each generated patch is evaluated against a large number of requests, say for example 1 million if
there are a large number of users.
The comparison is made on-the-fly, directly on user traffic. Doing regression testing “live” has the
advantage that there is no need to record the potentially enormous amount of production data.
Algorithm 2 is the main algorithm of the Regression Assessment Service. The Regression As-
sessment Service requires a copy of the Unmodified Application, the response of the Unmodified
Application, an execution comparison oracle, and a list of patches to regress (sent previously by the
Patch Generation Service).
Algorithm 2 The Regression Assessment Service algorithm
Input: A: Unmodified Application
Input: R: Execution Comparison Oracle
Input: Q: patches from Patch Generation Service
1: while new request r from Shadower do
2: out putre f ← the output of A for r (from Shadower)
3: for patch p in Q do
4: A′← apply p to A
5: out putA′ ← r send to A′
6: S← R(out putre f , out putA′ )
7: if S = false then
8: remove p from Q
9: else
10: regressionSuccessCountp++
11: end if
12: end for
13: send {Q, regressionSuccessCountp} to the developer
14: end while
For each successful request received from the Shadower (arrow c in Figure 1 and line 1 in
Algorithm 2), the Regression Assessment Service iterates over each patch to detect regressions (lines
3-12) in Algorithm 2). Finally, the patches that pass user traffic based regression testing are sent to
the developers (arrow d in Figure 1 and line 13 in Algorithm 2).
There is a major advantage of doing regression validation on user traffic: the user traffic contains
far more usage scenarios and far more diverse values than a regression test suite. Consequently, it
reduces the risk of overfitting, i.e. it reduces the risk of suggesting an incorrect patch to the developer.
We note that the Regression Assessment Service can also be used to validate a human patch with
the production traffic, as shown in arrow e of Figure 1. In this case, it means that the Regression
Assessment Service is used for live testing of code on user traffic.
3.1.3 Shadower. The role of the Shadower is to create shadow traffic from actual end-user
traffic coming into the application. The “shadow traffic” is made up of production requests that are
duplicated one or several times and sent to sandboxed shadow applications. In our case, the shadow
applications are the Patch Generation Service and Regression Assessment Service.
In Itzal, the Shadower receives the requests from the clients, duplicates them and sends one
duplicate to each service of the architecture (arrows a, c in Figure 1). The response is also shadowed
for the Regression Assessment Service (arrow f in Figure 1).
Definition: a “shadower” is a system to duplicate requests of message-driven application.
Definition: a “shadow application” is a duplicate and sandboxed copy of a production application,
which receives the same requests.
If the production application has a state (typically stored in a database), the shadow application
accesses to the production data through a read-only database connection1. This guarantees that the
shadow application never corrupts the production state, and that patch synthesis remains transparent
and safe for the unmodified, deployed application. The drawback is that it prevents repair of code
related to state modification. There are sophisticated ways for overcoming this limitation, but this is
a hard and unresearched problem which is left to future work.
1this is supported by all major databases, whether relational or NoSQL
In the context of web applications, the concept of running multiple instances of an application is
well known and heavily used: this is done for load balancing and rolling deployment. The difference
between a load balancer and a Shadower is twofold: first, a load balancer does not duplicate the
traffic; second, a load balancer does not send requests to sandboxed “sinks” as Itzal does.
Since Itzal is a production technique, it must have a reasonable impact on the performance of
the application. In order to minimize the impact on the Unmodified Application, Itzal computes
the Regression Assessment Service and the Patch Generation Service asynchronously. Indeed, the
goal of Itzal is to perform patch generation, it is not an automatic error recovery system. Hence, the
Shadower directly sends the output as soon as the Unmodified Application has handled a request
(even if there is a failure). Itzal does not have to wait for the end of the patch search or the regression
testing for sending the response back to the client. Consequently, the Shadower is the only component
that impacts the performance of the Unmodified Application.
In a typical HTTP-based setup, the cost of copying and rerouting requests on-the-fly is similar to
that of classical web proxies and load balancers, which are extensively used in production systems.
3.2 Prototype Implementation for Java
We have implemented a prototype of Itzal for Java in a tool named Itzal4j, which is dedicated to
message-driven applications based on HTTP. For sake of open-science, Itzal4j is publicly available
on http://anonymous.4open.science/repository/f5722a25-5510-4dd7-bd04-664d5f47715a/.
Itzal4j has a default Request-oracle based on unhandled exceptions. Any unhandled exception
happening during the processing of a request is considered as a failure. Also, for the case studies in
the domain of web applications that will be presented later in Section 4, we have also implemented
a Request-oracle based on HTTP return codes. According to the specification of the HTTP status
codes, the HTTP status code that begins with the digit “5” indicates that the server is aware that it has
encountered an error. Failure detection is achieved by checking whether the HTTP status code begins
with the digit “5”. If it is the case, the request is considered as failing. Otherwise, it is considered as
succeed.
3.2.1 Implementation of the Patch Generation Service. In our implementation, the Patch Gen-
eration Service uses two different patch enumeration techniques. First, our prototype system uses
the NPEFix model [Durieux et al. 2017a] which addresses null dereferences in Java. Second, our
prototype system also implements the exception-stop model [Dobolyi and Weimer 2008], which
prevents the failure from happening by adding try-catch blocks at the method level.
3.2.2 Implementation of the Regression Assessment Service. The Regression Assessment Service
first receives and stores a list of patches from the Patch Generation Service. Then, it will apply the
requests that it receives from the Shadower on each patch. Finally, the observable behavior of the
patched application is compared with that of the Unmodified Application, and the results of the
comparison are stored to provide statistics to the developers.
In Itzal4j, the HTTP body of the response of the Unmodified Application is compared against
that of the patched application (e.g., the HTML body text for web apps). The comparison discards
transient information (e.g., IP addresses and dates). It can further be configured with domain-specific
heuristics. If the outputs do not match, the patch is discarded and is permanently marked as a
“regressive patch”.
3.2.3 Implementation of the Shadower. The Shadower is implemented with the Jetty Proxy
Library.2 The major implementation challenge is to maintain a list of session identifiers (e.g. cookies)
for each shadowed service. To achieve this, when a session-enabled request arrives with the session ID
2Jetty Proxy Servlet http://www.eclipse.org/jetty/documentation/9.4.x/proxy-servlet.html
of the end user’s browser, the Shadower translates on-the-fly the session ID to each of the shadowed
services (and vice-versa for the response).
3.2.4 Implementation of the Sanboxing. Sandboxing is achieved using the Docker container
system, a major software containerization platform which provides powerful sandboxing capability
(including both disk and network sandboxing) [Docker [n. d.]]. The Patch Generation Service and
the Regression Assessment Service are encapsulated in their respective docker images, with disk and
network sandboxing enabled, so that it is impossible for them to impact the production state.
3.2.5 Communication with the Developer. Now we discuss the communication of the patches
with the developers (arrow d,e in Figure 1). In the current prototype, we use a web dashboard where
the developers follow in real time the failures, the generated patches and the progression of the
regression testing of the patches on user traffic. We also imagine an approach integrated into the
versioning system (Git/GitHub) where patches are communicated to the developers with automated
pull requests.
If patches exist for multiple failures, we use the failure count f ailureCountr from Algorithm 1
to order the patches. The idea is that the developer would prefer to spend time firstly to the most
frequent failures. It also happens that, for the same failure kind, multiple patches successfully pass
the regression testing done over the user traffic. Consequently, we also sort the patches in order
to first propose the most useful ones to the developers. We prioritize the patches according to the
regression success count (regressionSuccessCountp from Algorithm 2). The idea is that the more a
patch has been executed by the Regression Assessment Service, the more confidence we have in it.
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we demonstrate the feasibility of our novel and disrupting scheme of patch synthesis in
production. Our blueprint architecture addresses many different aspects: patch generation, regression
detection based on shadow traffic, and shadower.
We devise a research protocol that aims at: 1) studying each aspect one by one in isolation, and 2)
studying the Itzal from an end-to-end perspective. Figure 2 depicts the evaluation approach.
RQ1. [Live Patch Synthesis Feasibility] To what extent is it possible to generate patches in
production, directly from failing requests triggered by user traffic? The research question aims
at evaluating the Patch Generation Service to verify that it is possible to generate patches directly
from failures in a production environment, where failing requests replace failing test cases.
RQ2. [User Traffic Effectiveness for Regression] What is the effectiveness of using user-
traffic to perform live regression testing? The research question aims to evaluate the Regression
Assessment Service. We want to see whether one can use user traffic to discard incorrect patches.
We study the effectiveness of four execution comparison oracles which are used to compare the
behaviors of the patched application against that of the original application.
RQ3. [Performance] What is the performance overhead of Itzal? The research question aims
to evaluate the performance overhead of Itzal. We measure the performance overhead of our blueprint
architecture on a production system, and compute the required time needed by the Patch Generation
Service to generate the patches.
RQ4. [End-to-end Effectiveness] How does Itzal work in a production-like setting? While
RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3 specifically concentrate on Patch Generation Service, Regression Assessment
Service and Shadower, the research question aims to evaluate Itzal from an end-to-end perspective
by considering two real bugs that are reproducible in a live server environment with emulated traffic.
Benchmarks: Note that the subjects required to answer each of the 4 research questions are
not identical. They all share the characteristics of being really hard to obtain. For instance, it is
really difficult to collect and reproduce production failures in the laboratory. Consequently, we build
candidate patch invalid patch
valid patch reported patch
regressive patch
Patch generation service Regression assessment service
RQ1: patch search RQ2: regression with traffic
Production requests
Shadower
RQ3: performance
Itzal: global blueprint architecture
Fig. 2. Our research questions target each component in isolation as well as the global end-to-end approach.
one specific evaluation benchmark per research question. However, we have managed to have one
common case across all research questions: Mayocat-231 is used as a real bug in RQ1, as a regression
subject for RQ2, in the overhead measurement of RQ3, and in the end-to-end evaluation of RQ4.
4.1 RQ1. Live Patch Generation Feasibility
4.1.1 Benchmark. In order to evaluate whether patch generation can be made directly on produc-
tion failures, we need to identify real reproducible failures. To collect as many production bugs as
possible, we build a benchmark based on the failures used in five different papers from the literature:
[Just et al. 2014], [Long et al. 2017], [Gu et al. 2016], [Durieux et al. 2017a] and [Durieux et al.
2016].
Our inclusion criteria are as follows. First, we select the exception bugs. An exception bug is an
unhandled exception in production which makes a request crash. Second, we only keep the bugs for
which we are able to replay user traffic or setup that triggers the bug. Third, we discard the failures
that happen during initialization or shutdown of an application.
By applying the inclusion criteria, we eventually come up with 34 real production failures from 14
different applications. The benchmark contains 33 null pointer exceptions and one invalid argument
exception. For sake of open-science, this benchmark is publicly available on GitHub [Durieux et al.
2018].
In Table 1, the first five columns present the dataset. The first column contains a simple bug
identity, the second column contains the origin of the bug, the third column contains the type of
production oracle considered, the fourth column contains the type of the failure (NPE for Null Pointer
Exception, IAE for IllegalArgumentException), and the fifth column contains the number of lines of
Java code of the buggy application under consideration, which is computed with the CLOC tool.
4.1.2 Experimental Protocol for RQ1. To evaluate the patch generation of Itzal, we set up the
following experimental protocol. The main idea of this experimental protocol is to execute a HTTP
request that triggers a failure. Based on this failure the Patch Generation Service searches for patches.
The main novelty of this setup compared to test-suite based program repair is the following: while
previous experiments assume a manually written failing test case, Itzal only assumes a failing request.
This is greatly widens the applicability of the approach.
For the bug of our benchmark that uses HTTP status as failure oracle, we simulate a server that runs
the buggy version. This server waits for requests, as a production server would do. Then, we send a
request that triggers the failure. We check whether the failure is well detected by the Request-oracle,
the HTTP status in this case. Then, we put the failure-triggering request in an infinite loop to simulate
arriving user requests that trigger the failure, making the same failure happening again and again,
Table 1. The benchmark used in our experiments
Bug Origin Request Oracle B
ug
Ty
pe
LOC
BroadleafCommerce
1282
[Durieux et al. 2016] HTTP status NPE 161 428
Collection 360 [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 21 650
DataflowJavaSDK
c06125d
[Long et al. 2017] Exception NPE 50 655
Felix 4960 [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 33 057
Javapoet 70b38e5 [Long et al. 2017] Exception NPE 3 884
Jetty 335500 [Gu et al. 2016] HTTP status NPE 153 789
Jongo f46f658 [Long et al. 2017] Exception NPE 7 384
Lang 20 [Just et al. 2014] Exception NPE 49 637
Lang 304 [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 17 277
Lang 33 [Just et al. 2014] Exception NPE 45 444
Lang 39 [Just et al. 2014] Exception NPE 45 143
Lang 587 [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 17 319
Lang 703 [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 19 047
Math 1115 [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 90 782
Math 1117 [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 90 794
Math 290 [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 38 728
Math 305 [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 38 893
Math 369 [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 41 082
Math 4 [Just et al. 2014] Exception NPE 164 667
Math 70 [Just et al. 2014] Exception NPE 83 720
Math 79 [Just et al. 2014] Exception NPE 89 611
Math 988A [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 82 442
Math 988B [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 82 443
Mayocat 231 [Durieux et al. 2016] HTTP status NPE 31231
PDFBox 2812 [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 67 294
PDFBox 2965 [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 64 375
PDFBox 2995 [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 64 821
Sling 4982 [Durieux et al. 2017a] Exception NPE 583
Tomcat 43758 [Gu et al. 2016] HTTP status NPE 156 480
Tomcat 54703 [Gu et al. 2016] HTTP status NPE 186 301
Tomcat 55454 [Gu et al. 2016] HTTP status NPE 193 648
Tomcat 56010 [Gu et al. 2016] HTTP status IAE 195 130
Tomcat 58232 [Gu et al. 2016] HTTP status NPE 224 194
Webmagic ff2f588 [Long et al. 2017] Exception NPE 9 239
34 bugs from 14 software applications 2 622 172
as in production. Each time the failure happens, it triggers a patch search by the Patch Generation
Service. Hence, the Patch Generation Service enumerates all candidate patches and identify those
that make the failure disappear, i.e., that pass the Request-oracle.
Table 2. The feasibility of using two patch generation models for production failures. Many patches from the
patch models’ search space are marked as invalid because they fail to make the runtime exception disappear.
The main goal is to have non-zero values in column “# Valid”.
Patch Models
Bug NPEFix Exception-Stopper
# Valid # Invalid # Valid # Invalid
BroadleafCommerce 1282 5 8 0 0
Collection 360 16 35 64 44
DataflowJavaSDK c06125d 2 1 0 0
Felix 4960 4 6 0 1
Javapoet 70b38e5 0 133 12 87
Jetty 335500 2 2 2 2
Jongo f46f658 0 1 2 8
Lang 20 78 634 0 15
Lang 304 65 12 32 276
Lang 33 1 27 0 3
Lang 39 4 7 0 8
Lang 587 28 0 3 0
Lang 703 7 12 0 15
Math 1115 5 6 4 1
Math 1117 22 132 29 711 0 0
Math 290 4 10 4 3
Math 305 3 1 9 1
Math 369 23 3 22 2
Math 4 415 95 2 17
Math 70 1 25 0 24
Math 79 0 4 0 10
Math 988A 168 37 8 11
Math 988B 17 15 1 12
Mayocat 231 102 182 18 19
PDFBox 2812 4 21 2 9
PDFBox 2965 3 1 1 0
PDFBox 2995 1 4 1 1
Sling 4982 11 9 6 4
Tomcat 43758 1 9 1 0
Tomcat 54703 10 0 2 1
Tomcat 55454 1 0 1 0
Tomcat 56010 0 0 0 7
Tomcat 58232 3 0 0 0
Webmagic ff2f588 2 49 0 10
34 bugs from 14 software applications 23 118 31 060 198 592
For the other bugs due to unhandled exceptions, we encapsulate a small execution scenario that
triggers the unhandled exception into a HTTP request that could be run again and again. This small
execution scenario is also put in an infinite loop, as what happens in production with user-generated
requests.
Finally, we use the two patch models described in Section 3.2.1 to generate patches for the bugs
with. We count the number of invalid and valid patches for each failure and for each patch model.
4.1.3 Results. We now present the results for this research question. To answer this question,
we consider the columns # NPEFix Valid/Invalid and # Exception-Stopper Valid/Invalid of Table 2,
which show the number of valid and invalid patches generated by our two patch models respectively.
Valid means the initial failure does not happen anymore, and no other exceptions happen. Invalid
means that the initial failure still happens or other failures happen. The main goal is to have non-zero
values in column “# Valid”, this shows the feasibility of our vision.
For example, the first row of Table 2 presents the result for bug BroadleafCommerce 1282. This
bug is caused by a null dereference happening upon a user request. We assert the presence of the bug
in the application by using an HTTP-based production oracle: HTTP status. The first repair model,
NPEFix, generates 13 candidate patches, including 5 valid patches and 8 invalid patches. The second
repair model, Exception-Stop, does not generate any patch for this specific bug.
Overall, we can see from Table 2 that it is possible to generate patches for real-life production
failures. For all the 34 failures of our benchmark, at least one patch can be generated by the two
patch models used by Itzal. The Request-oracle is capable of discarding many invalid patches that
are in the search space of the considered synthesis techniques.
The number of generated patches varies significantly between projects and failures, the number of
candidate patches ranges from 2 (for Tomcat 55454) to 51843 (for Math 1117) and the number of
valid patches varies between 0 (for several failures) and 22132 (for Math 1117). This difference in
the number of generated patches from the two patch models emerges as NPEFix is able to generate
more patches than Exception Stopper in general. The underlying reason is that the search space of
the Exception Stopper patch model is smaller than that of NPEFix. The search space of Exception
Stopper is defined by the number of method calls in the stack and the number of variable/value
pairs that are available for returning from the current method. Instead, the search space of NPEFix
is defined by 9 repair strategies that contain several variants (different values for the placeholder)
depending on the context of execution.
Interestingly, we can see from the table that there are a lot of valid patches for both considered
patch models. This is a challenge because one would obviously not report to the developer so many
patches. However, this issue is handled later in Itzal because 1) the Regression Assessment Service
further removes patches and 2) the patches are displayed to the developers by the order of potential
value, as discussed in Section 3.2.5.
Meanwhile, we can also see from the table that NPEFix also has proportionally more valid patches
than Exception Stopper. This can be explained by two facts. On the one hand, Exception Stopper is a
generic repair technique, which works at the coarse-grain level. But NPEfix works at the point-of-
failure (statement level), and thus it generates patches that are more likely to be invalid. On the other
hand, our benchmark contains mostly null dereferences. NPEFix is thus favored as its strategies are
specifically designed to handle such failures. Note NPEFix is unable to handle failures that are not
null dereference by design (this is what happens for the failure in Tomcat 56010).
To sum up, for all the 34 failures of our benchmark, we show that it is possible to generate patches
using one or both patch models implemented in Itzal. This is a large proof-of-concept that it is
possible to generate patches directly from production failures.
Answer to RQ1. This novel experiment on 34 production failures shows that one can replay a
failing request to explore the search space of a patch model. Thus, it is possible to generate patches
directly in production based on user traffic. Our experimentation with two different patch models
shows that Itzal is oblivious to the actual patch generation technique.
4.2 RQ2. User Traffic Effectiveness for Regression.
We have shown that it is possible to generate patches directly from user traffic. We are now interested
in seeing if it is possible to use user traffic to discard regressive patches.
4.2.1 Benchmark. The benchmark of RQ1 has a single request, i.e., the failure-triggering one.
For this second research question, we need several requests for the same application, i.e., a workload.
We search for HTTP applications on the GitHub software repository with a focus on e-commerce
applications as e-commerce applications are easy to understand and consequently, we can create a
meaningful workload.
We identify three e-commerce applications that meet our criteria: Mayocat3, BroadLeaf Com-
merce4, and Shopizer5. Mayocat is composed of 31 231 lines of Java code, done over 1 670 commits,
and in development since 2012. BroadleafCommerce is bigger, it is composed of 154 309 lines of
code, done over 9 779 commits, and in development since 2008. Shopizer is composed of 61 555
lines of Java code, done over 154 commits, and in development since 2015. Similarly, for the sake of
open science, this benchmark is made publicly available on GitHub [Durieux et al. 2018].
User traffic: For each of these three e-commerce applications, we create a user traffic by identifying
a set of requests that execute the major user features, such as adding an item to the cart. Then we
automatically create 25 different user sessions that contain between 3 and 7 requests, selected
randomly from our set of requests. For sake of reproducibility, we always use the same random
seed. Consequently, we generate a user traffic of 124 requests for each e-commerce application. By
keeping the number of requests below 200, the experimental time remains manageable.
Failures: Since we aim at studying the Regression Assessment Service which detects regressions
introduced by patches, we need such patches. To achieve this, we first seed faults into the programs
and then consider a sample of patches generated by the patch model under consideration for the
seeded faults. We seed null dereference faults by removing the “then” block of a randomly sampled
not-null check that has been executed. For example, if an executed not-null check is “if (x==null)
then A else B”, we rewrite it as “B”. In other words, we remove the error-handling code which deals
with null values. We further check whether the seeded faults really trigger failures. Eventually, we
have 16 seeded faults that trigger failures under our emulated user traffic.
Patches: For each seeded fault, we select a random sample of patches that are in the search space
of NPEFix, one of the patch models implemented in the prototype implementation of Itzal. We
obtain a benchmark of 80 candidate patches to be considered for regression. The first two columns of
Table 3 present this benchmark.
4.2.2 Experimental Protocol for RQ2. To evaluate the Regression Assessment Service, we first
execute the user traffic as described in Section 4.2.1 on each considered patch.
Then, for each request of the user traffic, we compare the execution of the patched application
against that of the original application. In this context, it means defining a point of observation, col-
lecting some values at this point, and comparing the values collected on the original application with
that collected on the patched application. This enables us to observe differences, called “divergence”
in the rest of this paper, following the terminology introduced in [Palikareva et al. 2016]. If there
exists a divergence for a normal successful request, the patch is considered as a regression.
In this experiment, we consider four different execution comparison oracles to capture divergences.
The first is the HTTP status of the response, the second is the HTTP content of the response, the third
is the set of covered methods, and the final one is the set of covered blocks. For HTTP status and
3http://www.mayocat.org/
4http://www.broadleafcommerce.com/
5http://www.shopizer.com/
Table 3. The Effectiveness of four Execution Comparison Oracles to Detect Regressions based on User Traffic.
A green plain circle means that the oracle is effective at detecting the regression.
Oracles Is Valid PatchProjects Patch Location HTTP status HTTP content # Method # Block
Broadleaf
CategoryImpl:835 1 0% 17% 36% 40% No
CategoryImpl:835 2 0% 17% 36% 40% No
CategoryImpl:835 3 0% 20% 36% 41% No
CategoryImpl:835 4 0% 17% 36% 40% No
CategoryImpl:835 5 0% 20% 36% 41% No
CategoryImpl:835 6 0% 20% 36% 41% No
CategoryImpl:835 7 45% 48% 42% 47% No
OrderItemImpl:418 1 0% 1% 0% 0% Yes
OrderItemImpl:418 2 0% 1% 0% 0% No
OrderItemImpl:418 3 0% 1% 0% 0% Yes
RelatedProductsServiceImpl:208 1 0% 1% 0% 0% Yes
RelatedProductsServiceImpl:208 2 0% 7% 34% 38% No
RelatedProductsServiceImpl:208 3 0% 15% 3% 4% No
SolrHelperServiceImpl:531 1 0% 13% 0% 0% No
SolrHelperServiceImpl:531 2 35% 37% 11% 9% No
SolrHelperServiceImpl:531 3 35% 37% 11% 9% No
SolrHelperServiceImpl:531 4 35% 37% 11% 9% No
SolrHelperServiceImpl:531 5 35% 37% 11% 9% No
Mayocat
AbstractScopeCookieContainerFilter:202 1 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
AbstractScopeCookieContainerFilter:202 2 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
AbstractScopeCookieContainerFilter:202 3 0% 21% 6% 6% No
AbstractScopeCookieContainerFilter:202 4 0% 21% 6% 6% No
AbstractScopeCookieContainerFilter:202 5 0% 21% 6% 6% No
AbstractScopeCookieContainerFilter:256 1 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
AbstractScopeCookieContainerFilter:256 2 0% 0% 0% 0% No
AbstractScopeCookieContainerFilter:256 3 0% 0% 0% 0% No
AbstractScopeCookieContainerFilter:256 4 0% 0% 0% 0% No
DateAsTimestampArgumentFactory:30 1 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
DateAsTimestampArgumentFactory:30 2 0% 0% 1% 1% No
DateAsTimestampArgumentFactory:30 3 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
DateAsTimestampArgumentFactory:30 4 0% 0% 0% 0% No
DateAsTimestampArgumentFactory:30 5 0% 0% 0% 0% No
DefaultCartLoader:88 1 82% 82% 18% 16% No
DefaultCartLoader:88 2 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
DefaultCartManager:198 1 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
DefaultCartManager:198 2 0% 0% 0% 0% No
FlatStrategyPriceCalculator:38 1 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
FlatStrategyPriceCalculator:38 2 0% 5% 0% 0% No
FlatStrategyPriceCalculator:38 3 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
FlatStrategyPriceCalculator:38 4 0% 5% 0% 0% No
FlatStrategyPriceCalculator:38 5 20% 20% 1% 1% No
FlatStrategyPriceCalculator:38 6 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
FlatStrategyPriceCalculator:38 7 20% 20% 1% 1% No
MapAsJsonArgumentFactory:30 1 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
MapAsJsonArgumentFactory:30 2 0% 0% 2% 2% No
MapAsJsonArgumentFactory:30 3 0% 0% 0% 0% No
MapAsJsonArgumentFactory:30 4 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
MapAsJsonArgumentFactory:30 5 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
PostgresUUIDArrayArgumentFactory:30 1 0% 0% 1% 2% Yes
PostgresUUIDArrayArgumentFactory:30 2 0% 0% 0% 1% No
PostgresUUIDArrayArgumentFactory:30 3 0% 0% 0% 1% Yes
PostgresUUIDArrayArgumentFactory:30 4 0% 0% 0% 1% Yes
ProductMapper:44 1 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
ProductMapper:44 2 0% 0% 0% 0% No
ProductMapper:44 3 0% 0% 0% 0% No
ProductMapper:44 4 0% 0% 0% 0% No
ProductMapper:44 5 0% 0% 0% 0% No
Shopizer
CategoryFacadeImpl:55 1 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
CategoryFacadeImpl:55 2 0% 67% 6% 5% No
CategoryFacadeImpl:55 3 0% 67% 18% 18% No
CategoryFacadeImpl:55 4 0% 67% 15% 14% No
CategoryFacadeImpl:55 5 0% 67% 18% 18% No
ReadableCategoryPopulator:51 1 0% 0% 1% 1% No
ReadableCategoryPopulator:51 2 0% 67% 4% 3% No
ReadableCategoryPopulator:51 3 12% 67% 10% 7% No
ReadableCategoryPopulator:51 4 0% 67% 6% 4% No
ReadableCategoryPopulator:51 5 0% 67% 6% 5% No
ReadableProductPopulator:94 1 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
ReadableProductPopulator:94 2 0% 0% 0% 0% No
ReadableProductPopulator:94 3 26% 37% 9% 6% No
ReadableProductPopulator:94 4 26% 37% 11% 7% No
ReadableProductPopulator:94 5 26% 37% 11% 7% No
ShoppingCategoryController:253 1 0% 0% 0% 0% Yes
ShoppingCategoryController:253 2 0% 0% 0% 0% No
ShoppingCategoryController:253 3 0% 0% 0% 0% No
ShoppingCategoryController:253 4 0% 12% 2% 1% No
ShoppingCategoryController:253 5 12% 12% 2% 1% No
ShoppingCategoryController:253 6 12% 12% 2% 1% No
ShoppingCategoryController:253 7 12% 12% 2% 1% No
ShoppingCategoryController:253 8 12% 12% 2% 1% No
80 patches from 17 locations 16 42 39 42 23 valid patches
HTTP content, we collect the percentage of requests for which we observe differences in HTTP status
and content respectively. For method and block coverage, we first collect the coverage divergence for
each request and then compute the average value over all requests. Finally, we compare the oracle
results against a manual analysis of the generated patches.
4.2.3 Results. Table 3 contains the data obtained with the experimental protocol described in
Section 4.2.2, investigating whether the execution comparison oracles considered are able to detect
divergences. The first column of Table 3 contains the name of the project under consideration. The
second column contains the patch id which is composed of the class name, the line number, and
a sequential id. The four next columns of Table 3 provide the measured divergence between the
original program and the seeded programs using the 4 execution comparison oracles presented in
Section 4.2.2. A green plain circle means that the considered comparison oracle is able to detect a
regression on at least one request, which is desirable in the context of patch generation in production.
A crossed circle means that the execution comparison oracle fails to detect a divergence. An ideal
oracle would detect all divergences, but this would require to compare the whole execution state
which is impossible in practice. The last column, Is valid Patch, indicates if the generate patch is
semantically correct according to our manual analysis.
For example, the first row of Table 3 describes a patch for Broadleaf at line 835 of file CategoryImpl.
For this patch, the HTTP status does not detect a single divergence, the HTTP content detects a
divergence for 17% of the requests (i.e., 17% of the requests have different contents compared to the
original program), and the average divergences of method and block coverage across all requests are
36% and 40% respectively. When a line contains 0% for all four oracles, it means that either the
patch is correct (hence has no regressions) or that the synthetic workload we use is not rich enough
to highlight the regressions.
The HTTP status execution comparison oracle is easy to obtain but is at a relatively coarse level.
Indeed, we can see from Table 3 that the HTTP status oracle discards only 16 patches of the whole
80 patches. Since we do not have a reliable correctness oracle, it is not meaningful to compute
information retrieval metrics such as precision and recall. The HTTP status execution comparison
oracle has two main advantages. On the one hand, it has virtually no overhead. On the other hand, it
is directly generalizable to any HTTP based applications.
The HTTP content execution comparison oracle detects regressions for 42 of the whole 80 patches,
which is better than the HTTP status execution comparison oracle. However, it has a drawback: it
requires to define some transformations on the output in order to remove transient information. In
Itzal, the response is cleaned by removing certain transient information, e.g., date, a session key or
dynamic CSS classes. It is not always possible to identify all transient information. For instance,
for the patches at line 418 of file OrderItemImpl for project Broadleaf, the HTTP content execution
comparison oracle is considered as regressive because random inconsistencies happen in the HTML
response (one letter disappears at different locations). In the context of patch generation in production,
this means that some patches would be discarded because of transient information but not because of
an actual regression.
The method coverage and block coverage execution comparison oracles both detect more regres-
sions and have almost the same behavior. Compared to method coverage execution comparison oracle,
the block coverage execution comparison oracle detects regressions for 3 more patches located at file
PostgresUUIDArrayArgumentFactory for project Mayocat. While these two execution comparison
oracles are effective at detecting behavior changes, we have observed an issue: parallel execution can
introduce some randomness and consequently some variance in the observed dynamic coverage for a
given request. This can possibly be a reason for having correct patches that are discarded by at least
one oracle.
We consider the HTTP content as the best execution comparison oracle for regression detection
based on user traffic. The reasons are: 1) it is quite effective at detecting behavioral changes; 2)
its sensitivity can be overcome with careful design (on the contrary, it is virtually impossible to
overcome the non-determinism of observed coverage due to concurrency).
Now let us discuss the oracle results against the actual correctness as found by manual analysis.
Our manual analysis of the generated patches reveals that 16 patches are incorrect. However, these
16 incorrect patches have not been detected by any of the four oracles. In other words, the rows
for these 16 patches are indicated as invalid but with for all the 4 oracles in Table 3, e.g., Ab-
stractScopeCookieContainerFilter:256. The reason of this phenomenon is that our simulated HTTP
workload is not able to produce inputs that trigger the invalid behaviors of the incorrect patches.
There are also 6 patches for which the opposite phenomenon occurs: they are correct but they are
discarded due to randomness and multithreading as discussed above.
Answer to RQ2. It is possible to to employ user traffic to validate patches. To substantiate this
claim, our novel experimental methodology compares different execution comparison oracles that
are all available in production. In the context of HTTP based applications, we observe that the
HTTP status oracle, HTTP content oracle, method coverage oracle and block coverage oracle
successfully discard 16, 52, 39 and 42 out of 80 patches respectively. This result shows that 1) the
Itzal novel scheme is generic enough to accommodate different execution comparison oracles; 2)
using an HTTP content based execution comparison oracle represents a good trade-off to perform
live regression testing in message-driven applications.
4.3 RQ3. Itzal Performance
We now consider the performance of Itzal. We will focus first on the impact of the Shadower on the
performance of the application, and then evaluate how much time Itzal requires to generate patches.
4.3.1 Shadower Overhead. As we have previously discussed in Section 3.1.3, the performance of
the application is only impacted by the Shadower. Since the other two services (Patch Generation
Service and Regression Assessment Service) are executed asynchronously (no overhead on the
response time), the Shadower is the only one that may have user-visible impact.
In order to evaluate the performance impact of Shadower on the application and further on the
clients, we create a workload of 100 000 requests. We compare the performance of those requests
with the Shadower and without the Shadower. First, these 100 000 requests are launched sequentially
on the Mayocat application without the Shadower. Second, we execute the same 100 000 requests but
this time with the Itzal Shadower. We collect the average response time for the two infrastructures.
We observe that it takes on average 104ms to make a request directly to Mayocat. With Itzal
Shadower, it takes on average 114ms to make a request through the Shadower. This represents a
slowdown of 10ms per request or an overhead of 10.44% on average. The reason for the slowdown is
that the Shadower costs some time to copy the request to Patch Generation Service and Regression
Assessment Service, redirect the original request to the Mayocat application, and finally copy the
response of Mayocat to the Regression Assessment Service.
4.3.2 Patch Generation Service Performance. The role of the Patch Generation Service is to
generate the patches for the failing request. We now study how much time the Patch Generation
Service needs to generate these patches.
We apply Itzal on the bug Mayocat-231 and we execute the request that produces the failure. We
measure how much time the Patch Generation Service takes to exhaustively generate the patches
with the NPEFix repair model for this bug.
@@ FlatStrategyPriceCalculator.java
@@ -35,7 +35,8 @@
return BigDecimal.ZERO;
}
- price = price.add(carrier.getPerItem ().multiply(BigDecimal.valueOf(numberOfItems)));
+ BigDecimal perItem = carrier.getPerItem () != null ? carrier.getPerItem () : BigDecimal.ZERO
;
+ price = price.add(perItem.multiply(BigDecimal.valueOf(numberOfItems)));
return price;
}
Fig. 3. The human patch for bug Mayocat 231.
The result shows that the Patch Generation Service takes 4min and 33sec to generate the 286
candidate patches, which means that the Patch Generation Service takes on average 953ms to generate
one patch. Recall that this has no impact on the user, because the Patch Generation Service is called
in an asynchronous manner by the Shadower (see Section 3.1.3). In other words, the end-user does
not have to wait for 5 minutes in front of the browser.
Answer to RQ3. By design, the only component of Itzal that has an overhead in production is the
Shadower (all other components being called asynchronously, with no blocking callbacks). Our
experimental evaluation the Shadower’s overhead, shows that it adds on average a 10ms latency per
client request, which is negligible from a user experience perspective. When a failure is detected,
according to our benchmark, Itzal is able to generate one per patch per second, and the time to
explore the search space is linear in the number of patches.
4.4 RQ4. End-to-end Effectiveness of Itzal
While research questions RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3 concentrate on evaluating the Patch Generation
Service, Regression Assessment Service, and Shadower, the fourth research question aims to evaluate
Itzal from an end-to-end perspective by considering two real bugs that are reproducible in a live
server environment with emulated traffic. We do the end-to-end evaluation on two real bugs from
open-source ecommerce applications–Mayocat-231 and BroadleafCommerce-1282. Mayocat-231
is our working case and has already been used in all the above three research questions, and
BroadleafCommerce-1282 has been already used in RQ1.
4.4.1 Experimental Protocol for RQ4. To evaluate the end-to-end effectiveness of Itzal, we apply
Itzal on the two applications. The infrastructure consists of four different docker images and an
instance of Shadower that duplicates the requests and the responses to the different services. The
first docker image contains the Unmodified Application with the correct state to reproduce the bug.
The second and the third docker images are for the Patch Generation Service (one per patch model
NPEFix or Exception-stopper). The last docker image contains the Regression Assessment Service,
the infrastructure to identify regressions due to the generated patches.
Once the infrastructure is up and running, we launch the failing HTTP request that triggers the
patch generation by the Patch Generation Service. Then, each generated patch will be evaluated by
the Regression Assessment Service against the emulated traffic. Note that the emulated traffic here is
the same as the traffic used in the experiment for RQ2,
4.4.2 End-to-end Evaluation on Mayocat-231.
@@ FlatStrategyPriceCalculator.java
@@ -37,2 +37,5 @@
+ if (carrier.getPerItem () == null) {
+ return null;
+ }
price = price.add(carrier.getPerItem ().multiply(BigDecimal.valueOf(numberOfItems)));
Fig. 4. An invalid Itzal patch for bug Mayocat 231.
@@ FlatStrategyPriceCalculator.java
@@ -37,3 +37,7 @@
- price = price.add(carrier.getPerItem ().multiply(BigDecimal.valueOf(numberOfItems)));
+ if (carrier.getPerItem () == null) {
+ price = price.add( BigDecimal.ZERO.multiply(BigDecimal.valueOf(numberOfItems)));
+ } else {
+ price = price.add(carrier.getPerItem ().multiply(BigDecimal.valueOf(numberOfItems)));
+ }
return price;
Fig. 5. A patch found by Itzal for bug Mayocat 231.
Description of the bug. This bug is an unhandled null pointer exception of the e-commerce
application Mayocat (https://github.com/jvelo/mayocat-shop/issues/231). The bug is triggered during
the computation of the shipping cost of the current cart. This bug is present only for one specific
shipping strategy. When the bug happens, the user is left with a white page. Worse still, the user
session becomes completely unusable, which means that the website is completely broken for this
particular user. The client is thus unable to further navigate through the product list, buy a product or
even click on the “contact the administrator” link to report the issue.
Human patch. Figure 3 shows the snippet of code written by the human developer to fix the
bug. The patch consists of using “BigDecimal.ZERO” when the shipping price per product (“car-
rier.getPerItem()”) is null. It is a classical patch for null dereferences: adding a not-null check, here
in the form of a ternary expression.
Patch Generation Service. For the failing request, the Patch Generation Service of Itzal generates
284 candidate patches with patch model NPEFix and 37 candidate patches with patch model
Exception-Stopper (the complete list of the Itzal patches is available at [Durieux et al. 2018]). Out of
the 321 (284 + 37) candidate patches, 201 (182 + 19) fail to make the exception disappear or produce
another exception so that they are considered as invalid (as we did in RQ1). For example, let us
consider the candidate patch shown in Figure 4. This patch is invalid according to the Request-oracle,
because it produces a HTTP status 500, i.e., it indicates an internal server error. The reason is that
when this patch is applied, a null value is returned, which itself produces a new null pointer exception
in the caller method. This new null pointer exception makes the request fail and the server eventually
returns a HTTP 500 code. The Request-oracle well detects the HTTP error and the candidate patch is
considered as invalid.
Regression Assessment Service. Let us now consider the Regression Assessment Service. In our
simulation of bug Mayocat-231, the Regression Assessment Service performs regression testing
on 80 synthetic requests (as per RQ2). However, it does not reject patches based on this simulated
workload. This happens as the production traffic simulator is unable to create an input for this bug
that requires regression testing (the bug report only provide us with crashing input). Note this is
void populateEntityForm (...) {
...
String idProperty = adminEntityService.getIdProperty(cmd);
// null pointer exception here
// because entity.findProperty(idProperty) is null when idProperty is not present in "
entity"
ef.setId(entity.findProperty(idProperty).getValue ());
...
}
Fig. 6. The failure point of bug BroadleafCommerce-1282.
adminInstance.setUsername(adminInstance.getEmailAddress ());
if (customerService.readCustomerByUsername(adminInstance.getUsername ()) != null) {
- Entity error = new Entity ();
- error.addValidationError (" username", "nonUniqueUsernameError ");
- return error;
+ entity.addValidationError (" emailAddress", "nonUniqueUsernameError ");
+ return entity;
}
Fig. 7. The human patch for bug BroadleafCommerce-1282 (simplified version).
@@ FormBuilderServiceImpl.java
@@ -717,2 +717,5 @@
String idProperty = adminEntityService.getIdProperty(cmd);
+ if (entity.findProperty(idProperty) == null) {
+ return;
+ }
ef.setId(entity.findProperty(idProperty).getValue ());
Fig. 8. The Itzal patch for bug BroadleafCommerce-1282.
a limitation of our production traffic generator, not a conceptual limitation of Itzal. We note that
designing generators of likely synthetic traffic is an unresearched area yet a very difficult problem.
Comparison against the Human Patch. Among the 120 patches synthesized by Itzal which pass
all oracles in this setup, none is syntactically equivalent to the patch written by the developer.
However, Figure 5 shows an example of a semantically equivalent one, which has the same behavior
as the human patch. It replaces the null element (“carrier.getPerItem()”) by an existing variable
“BigDecimal.ZERO”found in the execution context.
Note that, as shown by Long and Rinard [Long and Rinard 2016a], it is common to have many
equivalently correct yet syntactically different patches in the search space of a patch model.
4.4.3 End-to-end Evaluation on BroadleafCommerce-1282. We now study the case of bug Broadleaf
Commerce-1282 (https://github.com/BroadleafCommerce/BroadleafCommerce/issues/1282), which
is still in the domain of e-commerce. We focus on showing an important point that was not highlighted
by the first case study: the fact that some aspects of patch optimality, in particular with respect to
user experience, are not handled by standard validity oracles.
Description of the bug. This bug is a null dereference that happens when the website administrator
adds a customer with an email address that already exists in the database (i.e., the email address is
already used by another customer). When this failure occurs, the user interface displays a low level
debugging stack trace. Contrary to bug Mayocat-231 that completely breaks the website, this bug has
a lower severity.
Figure 6 shows the failure point (i.e., where the null pointer exception happens): When idProperty
is “emailAddress”, “entity.findProperty(idProperty)” returns null as no such property exists in the
entity. Consequently, the call to “getValue()” results in a null pointer exception.
Itzal patches. Itzal generates 12 different compilable candidate patches with NPEFix patch model,
the other patch model did not succeed to generate patch for this bug (Again, the complete list of Itzal
patches is available at [Durieux et al. 2018]). Among the 12 patches, 5 of them avoid the null pointer
exception and do not produce any new bad behaviors that are detected by the Request-oracle.
Let us analyze one of them as shown in Figure 8. This patch handles the failure by exiting the
method when utility method “findProperty” does not find the required property. With this patch, no
dirty error message is displayed in the user interface and can be considered as a valid workaround to
the problem.
Comparison against the Human Patch. When comparing the Itzal patch against the human patch,
the surprise is that they are in different methods. The human patch (shown in Figure 7) is in
method “validateUniqueUsername”, and it essentially replaces the error identifier “username” by
“emailAddress”. Later on, at the failure point, the “emailAddress” property that is looked up is found
and no exception is thrown.
From the viewpoint of the Request-oracle (the absence of exception in this case study), both
patches handle the failure and both are correct. However, the human patch is conceptually better.
While the Itzal patch silently skips the action to be done and gives no feedback to the user, the
human patch transforms the exception into a clean and explicit warning about duplicate emails. This
shows that there are cases where the absence of domain knowledge in the patch model and/or in the
oracle results in sub-optimal patches. To overcome this problem, the developer always has the option
to improve the patches shown in the Itzal dashboard before merging them in the code base of the
application.
Answer to RQ4. This end-to-end experiment shows the feasibility of deploying the novel program
repair scheme Itzal on real applications. It also highlights that the main challenge of doing this kind
of research in the laboratory is to have good workloads reflecting production traffic.
5 RELATEDWORK
5.1 Test Suite Based Patch Generation
The literature on test suite based patch generation is growing very fast, and we here only present a
brief overview of notable contributions. GenProg [Le Goues et al. 2012] applies genetic programming
to the AST of a buggy program and generates patches by adding, deleting, or replacing AST nodes.
Prophet [Long and Rinard 2016b] and Genesis [Long et al. 2017] learn from existing successful
human patches to improve the repair success rate. SemFix [Nguyen et al. 2013b] is a constraint
based repair approach. It provides patches for assignments and conditions by combining symbolic
execution and code synthesis. DirectFix [Mechtaev et al. 2015] and Angelix [Mechtaev et al. 2016]
from the same team provide further improvement over SemFix. Nopol [Xuan et al. 2016] is also a
constraint based method, which focuses on repairing bugs in if-conditions and missing preconditions.
There are also some template-based patch generation approaches. PAR [Kim et al. 2013] uses 10
patch templates for common programming errors and Relifix [Tan and Roychoudhury 2015] defines
templates specifically for regression bugs.
Main novelty: Itzal does patch synthesis directly in production, which none of those contributions
address. Itzal does not require a failing test case or a strong regression test suite.
5.2 Runtime Repair in Production
Several automatic repair techniques handle failures in production, we now review the notable ones.
Rx [Qin et al. 2005] is a runtime repair system based on changing the environment upon failures.
Rx employs checkpoint-and-rollback for re-executing the buggy code when failures happen. Assure
[Sidiroglou et al. 2009] is a self-healing system also based on checkpointing. For both of them, there
is no patch generation strategy associated with the checkpoint and rollback mechanism.
Rinard et al. [Rinard et al. 2004] present a technique called “failure oblivious computing” to
avoid illegal memory accesses by adding additional code to each memory operation during the
compilation process. Dobolyi and Weimer [Dobolyi and Weimer 2008] present a technique to
tolerate null dereferences by introducing hooks to inject manufactured values. Long et al. [Long et al.
2014] also explore this idea with the concept of “recovery shepherding”. Upon certain errors (null
dereferences and divide by zero), recovery shepherding consists of returning manufactured values
for failure oblivious computing. Perkins et al. [Perkins et al. 2009] propose ClearView, a system
for automatically repairing errors in production by monitoring the system execution on low-level
registers to learn invariants. Gu et al. [Gu et al. 2016] present Ares, a runtime error recovery technique
for Java exceptions using JavaPathFinder (JPF).
Main novelty: these techniques do not directly produce source code patches that are communicated
to developers. On the contrary, Itzal provides a fully automated bridge between production and source
code patches for developers.
5.3 Shadow Traffic
The concept of shadow traffic is related with the execution of multiple versions of the same software
in parallel, called in the literature “multi-version execution” [Hosek and Cadar 2013], “parallel
execution” [Trachsel and Gross 2010] or simply “dual execution” [Kwon et al. 2016] when only two
versions run. However, none of these work aims to generate patches. Using shadow traffic for repair
has only recently been suggested in a short vision paper [Durieux et al. 2017b], which remains at the
concept level.
For security. Kwon et al. [Kwon et al. 2016] do dual execution for detecting information leaks
and attacks. Salamat et al. [Salamat et al. 2009] do multi-version execution also for the sake of
security, and they implement the monitor entirely in userspace. In both cases, patch generation is not
considered. The idea of shadow traffic is closely related to the idea of shadow executions introduced
by Capizzi et al. [Capizzi et al. 2008]. However, the goals are completely different. While they aim
at isolating all private information, our goal is to perform patch search.
For performance. Trachsel and Gross [Trachsel and Gross 2010] perform parallel execution to
speed up programs. The instances that are run in parallel are different implementations of the same
algorithm or different binary versions compiled with different optimization options. Compared to
Itzal, no actionable feedback is given to the developer.
For reliability. Hosek and Cadar [Hosek and Cadar 2013] do multi-version execution over versions
and switch between versions when a bug is detected. This technique can handle failures because
some bugs may disappear between different versions. It is not clear how this technique can be used
for patch generation.
Main novelty: to our knowledge, Itzal is the first approach to use production traffic for validating
automatically synthesized patches.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented Itzal, an approach for synthesizing patches live for production failures.
This novel and disrupting scheme for program repair is based on the conjunction of embedding the
patch search in production, together with validating the absence of regressions based on the whole,
diverse, production usages and values. We have evaluated our novel technique based on 34 failures.
This new line of research in automatic software repair calls for future work. First, there is a need to
research on how to efficiently synchronize an application and its shadows (the mirror applications fed
with the shadow traffic). Second, we envision a feedback loop with developers as follows. When a
developer discards or modifies a generated patch, this information should be given back to Itzal, then
the Patch Generation Service would automatically refine the patch model, the Regression Assessment
Service would automatically synthesize better execution comparison oracles, and finally, the patch
prioritization done in the dashboard would be the result of a machine learning approach.
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